Overview of new ISC Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities

Overall, the new Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities (April 12, 2010) is a good document and a definite step in the right direction. It has excellent intentions of achieving better protection using more economical solutions to defeat current threats. I have the following comments about this document:
Progressive: This is a progressive document by addressing and recognizing the fact of today's reality: the ever changing and usually increasing in severity terrorism threat. Furthermore, this document takes a broader look and recognizes that the threat doesn't have to be really large (i.e., terrorism), there might be smaller threats that may bring the operation to a complete halt or result in an undesirable outcome.
Better protection: This document will result in better-protected buildings and infrastructure because they will be designed to defeat today's real threats (and not some imaginary 4 psi threat). Furthermore, facilities will be designed to defend against multiple threats (large and/or small) and this will result in increased safety and resiliency. This document is also very flexible and adaptable with the intention not only to match but also to effectively defeat ever-changing tactics of our adversaries.
Economical: This document will also result in economical design by allowing design engineers to customize solutions to defeat a real threat. For example, it allows engineering professionals to apply variable protection solutions across the facility matching variable levels of threat (rather than one solution fits all approach).
Implications: One obvious change in this document is a significantly larger threat size. This larger threat size, at the first glance, could have significant cost implications. That is, the larger threat will result in more expensive protection measures. However, this conclusion is premature. There are two options owner and engineer can take to keep the cost of the protection within the reasonable range:
Option 1: The intent if this document is to achieve adequate protection over 90% of the building. This implies that under the larger threat 10% of a protective structure (say façade) can fail in a hazardous way. This allowable damage can be correctly applied to effectively reduce the cost.
Option 2: This document also allows the owner, under the guidance of a qualified blast engineer, to accept higher risk. This option implies that the level of risk can be correctly determined by the blast engineer. Risk determination involves a series of complex analysis simulations which should be undertaken by a professional.
Better Engineers: This new document will place a higher demand on better qualified blast consultants who should be capable of not only nonlinear dynamic analysis to design the structure, but also to predict and design 10% of the façade to hazardous failure, while striving for safer failure mechanisms and keeping cost of the protection measures within a reason. Additionally, blast consultants should be able to correctly employ the theory of structural reliability to estimate levels of risk, and if this risk is not acceptable, introduce targeted measures to reduce the risk in a cost effective manner. Hinman has been working on reliability theory and risk prediction over the past few years and is able to successfully quantify these parameters.
In conclusion, blast consultants need to be able to predict % failure and estimate risk; cost of construction will remain the same or even go down, while protection levels and quality of the facilities will definitely increase.

Shalva Marjanishvili
Technical Director

Antiterrorism Design of Military Facilities versus Civilian Federal Facilities

On May 20th I had the honor of providing expert testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on the risk implications of applying the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for GSA lease procurements. The title of the hearing was “Too Much for too Little: Finding the Cost-Risk Balance”
(http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/hearingDetail.aspx?NewsID=1200)

In short, the House is concerned about the cost of providing the large setback distances required by the DoD standards for new facilities housing “back office” DoD operations located within an office park or downtown area with an uncontrolled perimeter. Certainly, the 50 foot setback as required by the ISC is a lot more affordable than a 148 foot conventional standoff required by the DoD.

Personally, I tend to agree that, for DoD facilities housing administrative functions, it is not necessary to provide the same level of protection that we require for our service men and women living and working on military bases.

Of course, now the criteria governing both civilian federal facilities, issued by the Interagency Security Council (ISC), and the DoD standards are in flux. A new ISC document has been issued and a draft version of the DoD document is expected to be issued soon. My understanding is that the new ISC standards are now more in line with the DoD standards which would imply that it may now be more expensive to design new civilian federal buildings under certain circumstances.

I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on these issues.

Eve Hinman
Hinman Consulting Engineers